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Abstract
This paper compares mathematical models for automated market makers including logarithmic market scoring
rule (LMSR), liquidity sensitive LMSR (LS-LMSR), constant product/mean/sum, and others. It is shown that though
LMSR may not be a good model for Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications, LS-LMSR has several advantages
over constant product/mean based automated market makers. However, LS-LMSR requires complicated computation
(i.e., logarithm and exponentiation) and the cost function curve is concave. In certain DeFi applications, it is preferred
to have computationally efficient cost functions with convex curves to conform with the principle of supply and
demand. This paper proposes and analyzes constant circle/ellipse based cost functions for automated market makers.
It is shown that the proposed cost functions are computationally efficient (only requires multiplication and square root
calculation) and have several advantages over widely deployed constant product cost functions.
1 Introduction
Decentralized finance (DeFi or open finance) is implemented through smart contracts (DApps) which are stored on a
public distributed ledger (such as a blockchain) and can be activated to automate execution of financial instruments
and digital assets. The immutable property of blockchains guarantees that these DApps are also tamper-proof and the
content could be publicly audited.
DeFi applications range from automated markets, price oracles, to financial derivatives and many others. Most
DeFi applications (such as Bancor [7], Celo [8], Uniswap [15], Compound [9], etc) enable smart token transac-
tion instantly by using price equilibrium mechanisms based on total availability supply (or called bonding curves),
though still some of DeFi applications do not carry out instant transaction. For example, the Gnosis Protocol (for-
merly Dfusion Protocol) [3] revised the traditional continuous double auction design to a discrete double auction
design to address challenges with front-running. In a blockchain system, traders submit their transactions to the entire
blockchain network, a miner in the system collects these transactions, validates them, and puts them into a valid block
that is eventually added to an immutable chain of blocks. These transactions are visible to all nodes. A malicious
node (the miner itself could be malicious) may construct his/her own malicious transactions based on these observed
transactions. These malicious transactions may take profit with minimal or zero cost. In addition to the front-running
attacks, it is also common to mount attacks against DeFi price oracles. In the DeFi market, a lender (a smart contract)
normally queries an oracle to determine the fair market value (FMV) of borrower’s collateral. The oracle could be
on-chain-centralized, on-chain-decentralized, off-chain-centralized or off-chain-decentralized. For example, Celo [8]
protocol employs stable coins based on a multi-asset tiered reserve and allows a decentralized exchange in which the
different local and regional currencies and the reserve currency can be traded amongst one another without a central
party. When coin supply in the Celo protocol needs to expand (when the price of Celo Dollar is above the peg), the
protocol creates new coins to purchase a basket of cryptographic currencies at market rates through a smart contract.
When the coin supply in the Celo protocol needs to contract, the protocol uses reserve assets to buy Celo Dollars on
the open market. To determine the price of Celo stable currencies, the Celo protocol uses a Schelling-point scheme
amongst stakeholders. In summary, Celo employs a kind of off-chain-centralized price oracle. Compound [9] is an-
other DeFi application with an off-chain-centralized price oracle. Compound allows users to put their cryptographic
assets in a saving account to earn interest though at the same time to use these assets in the saving account as collateral
to take out loans. Uniswap [15] is a protocol with on-line-decentralized price oracles. A Uniswap smart contract
holds liquidity reserves of various tokens, and trades are executed directly against these reserves using the constant
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product cost function. Uniswap v2 allows contracts to estimate the time-weighted average price over a given interval
and supports flash swaps. tl;dr [14] describes a few practical attacks against various price oracles. The examples in-
clude attacks against DDEX’s on-chain-decentralized ETH/DAI and ETH/USA oracles, bZx’s DeFi applications with
on-chain-decentralized Kyber Networks oracles, and Uniswap’s on-line-decentralized price oracles.
Yet another popular DeFi application is flash loan that is only valid within one blockchain transaction. Flash loan
is a relatively new financial instrument and it could be vulnerable to many potential attacks. On February 15, 2020,
a user mounted an attack against Aave’s flash loans which obtained a profit of 350k USD with a transaction fee of
132.36 USD. Qin et al [13] described this attack in detail and pointed out that if the user optimized his/her attack,
she/he could have made 829.5k USD indeed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction to prediction markets and introduces/pro-
poses/analyzes various models for automated market makers: logarithmic market scoring rules (LMSR), liquidity
sensitive LMSR (LS-LMSR), constant product/mean/sum markets, and constant circle/ellipse cost functions. Section
3 compares various cost functions from aspects of the principle of supply and demand, coin liquidity, and token price
fluctuation. Section 4 compares price amplitude for various cost functions and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Prediction market and combinatorial market makers
2.1 Prediction market and combinatorial market makers
It is commonly believed that combined information/knowledge of all traders are incorporated into stock prices imme-
diately (Fama [2] includes this as one of his “efficient market hypothesis”) . For example, these information may be
used by traders to hedge risks in financial markets such as stock and commodities future markets. With aggregated
information from all sources, speculators who seek to “buy low and sell high” can take profit by predicting future
prices from current prices and aggregated information. Inspired by these research, the concept of “information mar-
ket” was introduced to investigate the common principles in information aggregation. Among various approaches to
information market, a prediction market is an exchange-traded market for the purpose of eliciting aggregating beliefs
over an unknown future outcome of a given event. As an example, in a horse race with n horses, one may purchase
a security of the form “horse A beats horse B”. This security pays off $1 if horse A beats horse B and $0 otherwise.
Alternatively, one may purchase other securities such as “horse A stands at a position in S” where S is a subset of
{1, · · · , n}. For the horse race event, the outcome space consists of the n! possible permutations of the n horses.
For prediction markets with a huge outcome space, the continuous double-sided auction (where the market maker
keeps an order book that tracks bids and asks) may fall victim of the thin-market problem. Firstly, in order to trade,
traders need to coordinate on what or when they will trade. If there are significantly less participants than the size of
the outcome space, the traders may only expect substantial trading activities in a small set of assets and many assets
could not find trades at all. Thus the market has a low to poor liquidity. Secondly, if a single participant knows
something about an event while others know nothing about this information, this person may choose not to release
this information at all or only release this information gradually. This could be justified as follows. If any release of
this information (e.g., a trade based on this information) is a signal to other participants that results in belief revision
discouraging trade, the person may choose not to release the information (e.g., not to make the trade at all). On
the other hand, this person may also choose to leak the information into the market gradually over time to obtain a
greater profit. The second challenge for the standard information market is due to the irrational participation problem
where a rational participant may choose not to make any speculative trades with others (thus not to reveal his private
information) after hedging his risks derived from his private information.
2.2 Logarithmic market scoring rules (LMSR)
Market scoring rules are commonly used to overcome the thin market and the irrational participation problems dis-
cussed in the preceding section. Market scoring rule based automated market makers implicitly/explicitly maintain
prices for all assets at certain prices and are willing to trade on every assets. In recent years, Hanson’s logarith-
mic market scoring rules (LMSR) automated market maker [5, 6] has become the de facto automated market maker
mechanisms for prediction markets.
Let X be an independent random variable with a finite outcome space Ω. Let p be a reported probability estimate
for the random variable X . That is,
∑
ω∈Ω p(ω) = 1. In order to study rational behavior (decision) with fair fees,
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Good [4] defined a reward function with the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) as follows:
{sω(p) = b ln(2 · p(ω))} (1)
where b > 0 is a constant. A participant in the market may choose to change the current probability estimate p1 to a
new estimate p2. This participant will be rewarded sω(p2)− sω(p1) if the outcome ω happens. Thus the participant
would like to maximize his expected value (profit)
S(p1,p2) =
∑
ω∈Ω
p2(ω) (sω(p2)− sω(p1)) = b
∑
ω∈Ω
p2(ω) ln
p2(ω)
p1(ω)
= bD(p2||p1) (2)
by honestly reporting his believed probability estimate, where D(p2||p1) is the relative entropy or Kullback Leibler
distance between the two probabilities p2 and p1. An LMSR market can be considered as a sequence of logarithmic
scoring rules where the market maker (that is, the patron) pays the last participant and receives payment from the first
participant.
Equivalently, an LMSR market can be interpreted as a market maker offering |Ω| securities where each security
corresponds to an outcome and pays $1 if the outcome is realized [5]. In particular, changing the market probability
of ω ∈ Ω to a value p(ω) is equivalent to buying the security for ω until the market price of the security reaches p(ω).
As an example for the decentralized financial (DeFi) automated market maker on blockchains, assume that the market
maker offers n categories of tokens. Let q = (q1, · · · , qn) where qi represents the number of outstanding tokens for
the token category i. The market maker keeps track of the cost function
C(q) = b ln
n∑
i=1
eqi/b (3)
and a price function for each token
Pi(q) =
∂C(q)
∂qi
=
eqi/b∑n
j=1 e
qj/b
(4)
It should be noted that the equation (4) is a generalized inverse of the scoring rule function (1). The cost function
captures the amount of total assets wagered in the market where C(q0) is the market maker’s maximum subsidy to the
market. The price function Pi(q) gives the current cost of buying an infinitely small quantity of the category i token.
If a trader wants to change the number of outstanding shares from q1 to q2, the trader needs to pay the cost difference
C(q2)− C(q2).
Chen et al [1] showed that it is #P -hard (in the variable n) to compute price function Pi(q) for subset betting and
pair betting. However, in DeFi applications, a patron may only offer automated markets with a small n (e.g., a pair
of tokens). Thus the results in [1] do not incur challenges for implementing LMSR based DeFi applications. LMSR
automated market makers have been implemented in Augur [12] and Gnosis [3].
Next we use an example to show how to design automated market makers using LMSR. Assume that b = 1 and the
patron sets up an automated market marker q0 = (1000, 1000) by depositing 1000 coins of token A and 1000 coins of
token B. The initial market cost is C(q0) = ln
(
e1000 + e1000
)
= 1000.693147. The instantaneous prices for a coin
of tokens are
PA(q0) =
e1000
e1000 + e1000
= 0.5 and PB(q0) =
e1000
e1000 + e1000
= 0.5
If this automated market maker is used as a price oracle, then one coin of token A equals PA(q0)PB(q0) = 1 coin of token B.
If a trader uses 0.689772 coins of token B to buy 5 coins of token A from market q0, then the market moves to a state
q1 = (995, 1000.689772) with a total market cost C(q1) = 1000.693147 = C(q0). The instantaneous prices for a
coin of tokens in q1 are PA(q1) = 0.003368975243 and PB(q1) = 295.8261646. Now a trader can use 0.0033698
coins of tokenB to purchase 995 coins of tokenA from the automated market maker q1 with a resulting market maker
state q2 = (0, 1000.693147) and a total market cost C(q2) = 1000.693147 = C(q0). The instantaneous prices for a
coin of tokens in market maker q2 are PA(q2) = 2.537979907× 10−435 and PB(q2) = 1.
The above example shows that LMSR based automated market maker works well only when the outstanding shares
of the tokens are evenly distributed (that is, close to 50/50). When the outstanding shares of the tokens are not evenly
distributed, a trader can purchase all coins of the token with lesser outstanding shares and let the price ratio PA(q)PB(q)
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changes to an arbitrary value with a negligible cost. This observation is further justified by the LMSR cost function
curves in Figure 1. The first plot is for the cost function C(x, y, z) = 100 with three tokens and the second plot is
for the cost function C(x, y) = 100 with two tokens. The second plot shows that the price for each token fluctuates
smoothly only in a tiny part (the upper-right corner) of the curve with evenly distributed token shares. Outside of this
part, the tangent line becomes vertical or horizontal. That is, one can use a tiny amount of one token to purchase all
outstanding coins of the other token in the market maker. In a conclusion, LMSR based automated market makers
may not be a good solution for DeFi applications.
Figure 1: LMSR market maker cost function curves for C(x, y, z) = 100 and C(x, y) = 100
2.3 Liquidity-sensitive automated market maker LS-LMSR
In the traditional prediction market, the three desired properties for a pricing rule to have include: path independence,
translation invariance, and liquidity sensitivity. Path independence means that if the market moves from one state to
another state, the payment/cost is independent of the paths that it moves. For example, this means that a trader cannot
place a series of transactions and profit without assuming some risk. Translation invariance requires that the cost of
buying a guaranteed payout of x always costs x. Liquid sensitivity means that a fixed-size investment moves prices
less in thick (liquid) markets than in thin (illiquid) markets.
Definition 2.1 (see, e.g., Othman et al [11]) For a pricing rule P ,
1. P is path independent if the value of line integral (cost) between any two quantity vectors depends only on those
quantity vectors, and not on the path between them.
2. P is translation invariant if
∑
i Pi(q) = 1 for all valid market state q.
3. P is liquidity insensitive if Pi(q+ (α, · · · , α)) = Pi(q) for all valid market state q and α.
Othman et al [11] showed that no market maker can satisfy all three of the desired properties at the same time.
Furthermore, Othman et al [11] showed that LMSR satisfies translation invariance and path independence though not
liquidity sensitivity. Then, by relaxing the translation invariance, Othman et al [11] proposed the Liquidity-Sensitive
LMSR market. In particular, LS-LMSR changes the constant b in the LMSR formulas to b(q) = α
∑
i qi where α is a
constant and requiring the cost function to always move forward in obligation space. Specifically, for q = (q1, · · · , qn),
the market maker keeps track of the cost function
C(q) = b(q) ln
n∑
i=1
eqi/b(q) (5)
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and a price function for each token
Pi(q) = α ln
 n∑
j=1
eqj/b(q)
+ eqi/b(q)∑nj=1 qj −∑nj=1 qjeqj/b(q)∑n
j=1 qj
∑n
j=1 e
qj/b(q)
(6)
Furthermore, in order to always move forward in obligation space, we need to revise the cost that a trader should pay.
In the proposed “no selling” approach, assume that the market is at state q1 and the trader tries to impose an obligation
qδ = (q
′
1, · · · , q′n) to the market with q¯δ = mini q′i < 0. That is, the trader puts q′i coins of token i to the market if
q′i ≥ 0 and receives −q′i coins of token i from the market if q′i < 0. Let q¯δ = (−q¯δ, · · · ,−q¯δ). Then the trader should
pay
C(q+ qδ + q¯δ) + q¯δ − C(q) (7)
and the market moves to the new state q + qδ + q¯δ . In the proposed “covered short selling approach”, the market
moves in the same way as LMSR market except that if the resulting market q′ contains a negative component, then
the market q′ automatically adds a constant vector to itself so that all components are non-negative. In either of the
above proposed approach, if q+ qδ contains negative components, extra shares are automatically mined and added to
the market to avoid negative outstanding shares. This should be avoided in DeFi applications. In DeFi applications,
one should require that qδ could be imposed to a market q0 only if there is no negative component in q + qδ and the
resulting market state is q + qδ . LS-LMSR is obviously path independent since it has a cost function. Othman et al
[11] showed that LS-LMSR has the desired liquidity sensitive property. Figure 2 displays the curve of the cost function
C(x, y, z) = 100 for LS-LMSR market maker with three tokens and the curve of the cost function C(x, y) = 100 for
LS-LMSR market maker with two tokens. It is clear that these two curves are concave.
Figure 2: LS-LMSR market maker cost function curves for C(x, y, z) = 100 and C(x, y) = 100
2.4 Constant product/sum/mean automated market makers
Constant product market makers have been used in DeFi applications (e.g., Uniswap [15]) to enable on-chain ex-
changes of digital assets and on-chain-decentralized price oracles. In this market, one keeps track of the cost function
C(q) =
∏n
i=1 qi as a constant. For this market, the price function for each token is defined as
Pi(q) =
∂C(q)
∂qi
=
∏
j 6=i
qj .
Figure 3 shows the curve of the constant product cost function xyz = 100 with three tokens and the curve of the
constant product cost function xy = 100 with two tokens. It is clear that the constant product cost function is convex
which conforms to the principle of supply and demand.
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Figure 3: Constant product cost function curves for xyz = 100 and xy = 100
The cost function C(q) =
∏n
i=1 q
wi
i has been used to design constant mean automated market makers [10] where
wi are positive real numbers. In the constant mean market, the price function for each token is
Pi(q) =
∂C(q)
∂qi
= wiq
wi−1
i
∏
j 6=i
qj .
Figure 4 shows the curve of the constant mean cost function xy2z3 = 100 with three tokens and the curve of the
constant mean cost function x2y3 = 100 with two tokens. It is clear that the constant mean cost function is a convex
function.
Figure 4: Constant mean cost function curves for xy2z3 = 100 and x2y3 = 100
One may also use the cost function C(q) =
∑n
i=1 qi to design constant sum market makers. In this market, the
price for each token is always 1. That is, one coin of a given token can always be used to trade for one coin of another
token at any time when supply lasts. Figure 5 shows the curve of the constant sum cost function x+ y+ z = 100 with
three tokens and the curve of the constant sum cost function x+ y = 100 with two tokens.
It is straightforward to check that constant product/mean/sum automated market makers achieve path independence
but not translation invariance. Furthermore, constant product/mean automated market makers are liquidity sensitive
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Figure 5: Constant sum market maker cost function curves for x+ y + z = 100 and x+ y = 100
and constant sum automated market maker is liquidity insensitive.
2.5 Constant ellipse/circle automated market makers
Section 3 compares the advantages and disadvantages of LMSR, LS-LMSR, and constant product/mean/sum auto-
mated market makers. The analysis shows that none of them is ideal for DeFi applications. In this section, we propose
automated market makers based on constant ellipse/circle cost functions. That is, the automated market maker’s cost
function is defined by
C(q) =
n∑
i=1
(qi − a)2 + b
∑
i 6=j
qiqj (8)
where a, b are constants. In constant ellipse/circle automated market makers, the price function for each token is
Pi(q) =
∂C(q)
∂qi
= 2(qi − a) + b
∑
j 6=i
qj .
For automated market makers, we only use the first quadrant of the coordinate plane. By adjusting the parameters a, b
in the equation (8), one may keep the cost function to be concave (that is, using the upper-left part of the ellipse/circle)
or to be convex (that is, using the lower-left part of the ellipse/circle). By adjusting the absolute value of a, one may
obtain various price amplitude and price fluctuation rates based on the principle of supply and demand for tokens.
It is observed that constant ellipse/circle automated market maker price functions are liquidity sensitive and path
independent but not translation invariance.
Figure 6 shows the curve of the constant ellipse cost function
(x− 10)2 + (y − 10)2 + (z − 10)2 + 1.5(xy + xz + yz) = 350
with three tokens and the curve of the the constant ellipse cost function
(x− 10)2 + (y − 10)2 + 1.5xy = 121
with two tokens. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, one may use convex or concave part of the ellipse for the
cost function. For example, in the second plot of Figure 6, one may use the lower-left part in the first quadrant as a
convex cost function or use the upper-right part in the first quadrant as a concave cost function.
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Figure 6: Constant ellipse/circle cost function curves for three and two tokens
3 Supply and demand, coin liquidity, and token price fluctuation
Without loss of generality, this section considers automated market makers consisting of two tokens: a USDT token
where each USDT coin costs one US dollar and an imagined spade suit token ♠. The current market price of a ♠
token coin could have different values such as half a USDT coin, one USDT coin, two USDT coins, or others. In
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications, the patron needs to provide liquidity by depositing coins of both tokens
in the automated market maker. Without loss of generality, we assume that, at the time when the automated market
maker is incorporated, the market price for a coin of spade suit token is equivalent to one USDT coin. For general
cases that the market price for one ♠ coin is not equivalent to one USDT coin at the time when the market maker is
incorporated, we can create virtual shares in the automated market maker by dividing or merging actual coins. That
is, each share of USDT (respectively ♠) in the automated market maker consists of a multiple or a portion of USDT
(respectively ♠) coins. One may find some examples in Section 4.
To simplify our notations, we will use q = (x, y) instead of q = (q1, q2) to represent the market state. In this
section, we will only study the price fluctuation of the first token based on the principle of supply and demand and the
trend of the price ratio Px(q)Py(q) . By symmetry of the cost functions, the price fluctuation of the second token and the ratio
Py(q)
Px(q)
have the same property. In the following, we analyze the token price fluctuation for various automated market
maker models with the initial market state q0 = (1000, 1000). That is, the patron creates the automated market maker
by depositing 1000 USDT coins and 1000 spade suit coins in the market. The analysis results are summarized in Table
1.
Table 1: Token price comparison
AMM type market cost Px(q)/Py(q) tangent line slope ∂y∂x
LS-LMSR 2386.294362 (0.6481, 1.5430) (-1.5430,-0.6481)
constant product 1000000 (0,∞) (−∞, 0)
constant sum 2000 1 -1
constant circle 50000000 (0.6236, 1.6036) (−1.6036,−0.6236)
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3.1 LS-LMSR
For the LS-LMSR based automated market maker, the market cost is
C(q0) = 2000 · ln
(
e1000/2000 + e1000/2000
)
= 2386.294362.
At market state q0, the instantaneous prices for a coin of tokens are Px(q0) = Py(q0) = 1.193147181. A trader may
use 817.07452949 spade suit coins to purchase 1000 USDT coins with a resulting market state q1 = (0, 1817.07452949)
and a resulting market cost C(q1) = 2386.294362. At market state q1, the instantaneous prices for a coin of tokens
are Px(q1) = 0.8511445298 and Py(q1) = 1.313261687. Thus we have Px(q1)/Py(q1) = 0.6481149479. The
tangent line slope of the cost function curve indicates the token price fluctuation stability in the automated market.
The tangent line slope for the LS-LMSR cost function curve at the market state q = (x, y) is
∂y
∂x
= −Px(q)
Py(q)
= −
(x+ y)
(
e
x
x+y + e
y
x+y
)
ln
(
e
x
x+y + e
y
x+y
)
+ y
(
e
x
x+y − e yx+y
)
(x+ y)
(
e
x
x+y + e
y
x+y
)
ln
(
e
x
x+y + e
y
x+y
)
+ x
(
e
y
x+y − e xx+y
) .
For the LS-LMSR automated market maker with an initial state q0 = (1000, 1000), the tangent line slope (see Figure
7) changes smoothly and stays between −1.542936177 and −0.6481149479. Thus the token price fluctuation is quite
smooth. By the principle of supply and demand, it is expected that when the token supply increases, the token price
decreases. That is, the cost function curve should be convex. However, the cost function curve for LS-LMSR market
is concave. This can be considered as a disadvantage of LS-LMSR markets for certain DeFi applications. Though
LS-LMSR does not satisfy the translation invariance property, it is shown in [11] that the sum of prices are bounded
by 1 + αn lnn. For the two token market with α = 1, the sum of prices are bounded by 1 + 2 ln 2 = 2.386294362
and this value is achieved when x = y.
Figure 7: Tangent line slopes for LS-LMSR cost function (first) and constant product cost function (second)
As an additional example of LS-LMSR automated market makers, a trader may spend 10 USDT coins to purchase
10.020996 coins of spade suit token at market state q0 or spend 500 USDT coins to purchase 559.926783 coins of
spade suit from the market state q0 with a resulting market state (1500, 440.073217). Furthermore, in the market state
(1500, 440.073217), the value of one USDT coin is equivalent to the value of 1.260346709 coins of spade suit token.
3.2 Constant product, constant mean, and constant sum
For the constant product automated market maker, the market cost is C(q0) = 1000000 and the constant product cost
function is x · y = 1000000. At market state q0, the instantaneous token prices are Px(q0) = Py(q0) = 1000. Thus
we have Px(q)Py(q) = 1. A trader may use one USDT coin to buy approximately one coin of spade suit token and vice
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versa at the market state q0. However, as market state moves on, the prices could change dramatically based on token
supply in the market and the pool of a specific coin will never run out. Specifically, at market state q0, a trader may
spend 10 USDT coins to purchase 9.900990099 spade suit coins. On the other hand, a user may spend 500 USDT
coins to purchase only 333.3333333 coins of spade suit token from the market state q0 with a resulting market state
q1 = (1500, 666.6666667). Note that in the example of LS-LMSR market example, at market state q0, a trader can
spend 500 USDT coins to purchase 559.926783 coins of spade suit. Furthermore, in the market state q1, one USDT
coin could purchase 0.4444444445 coins of spade suit token. The tangent line slope of the cost function curve at the
market state q = (x, y) is
∂y
∂x
= −Px(q)
Py(q)
= −y
x
.
That is, the tangent line slope for the cost function curve (see Figure 7) can go from −∞ to 0 and the token price
fluctuation could be very sharp. Specifically, if the total cost of the initial market q0 is “small” (compared against
attacker’s capability), then a trader/attacker could easily control and manipulate the market price of each coins in the
automated market maker. In other words, this kind of market maker may not serve as a reliable price oracle. A good
aspect of the constant product cost function is that the curve is convex. Thus when the token supply increases, the
token price decreases. On the other hand, the sum of prices Px(q) + Py(q) = x + y in constant product market is
unbounded. Thus constant production cost function could not be used in prediction markets since it leaves a chance
for a market maker to derive unlimited profit from transacting with traders.
For constant mean automated market makers, Figure 4 displays an instantiated constant mean cost function curve.
The curve in Figure 4 is very similar to the curve in Figure 3 for the constant product cost function. Thus constant
mean automated market maker has similar properties as that for constant product automated market maker and we will
not go into details.
For constant sum automated market makers, the market cost is C(q0) = 2000 and the constant sum cost function
is x+y = 2000. A trader can always use one USDT coin to buy one spade suit token coin in the market and vice versa.
This price is fixed and will not change as long as token supply lasts in the market. For example, a trader may spend
1000 USDT coins to purchase 1000 spade suit coins with a resulting market state q1 = (2000, 0). At the market state
q1, no one can purchase spade suit coins any more until someone spends some spade suit coins to purchase USDT
coins from this market. Due to the fact that coin prices are fixed in this constant sum market maker, this kind of market
may only be useful for stable coins whose relative prices do not change over time.
3.3 Constant circle and ellipse
As we have mentioned in the preceding Sections, one may use the upper-right part of the curve for a concave cost
function or use the lower-left part of the curve for a convex cost function. In order to conform to the principle
of supply and demand, we analyze the convex cost functions based on constant circle/ellipse. Constant circle and
constant ellipse share many similar properties though they have different characteristics. By adjusting corresponding
parameters, one may obtain different cost function curves with different properties (e.g., different price fluctuation
range, different tangent line slope range, etc). The approaches for analyzing these cost function curves are similar.
Our following analysis uses the low-left convex part of the circle (x − 6000)2 + (y − 6000)2 = 2 × 50002 as the
constant cost function.
For automated market makers based on this cost function C(q) = (x − 6000)2 + (y − 6000)2, the market cost
is C(q0) = 50000000. At market state q0, the instantaneous prices for a coin of tokens are Px(q0) = Py(q0) =
−10000. A trader may use 1258.342613 spade suit coins to purchase 1000 USDT coins with a resulting market state
q1 = (0, 2258.342613) and a resulting market cost C(q1) = C(q0). At market state q1, the instantaneous prices for a
coin of tokens are Px(q1) = 12000 and Py(q1) = 7483.314774. Thus we have
Px(q1)
Py(q1)
= 1.603567451. The tangent
line slope of the cost function curve at the market state q = (x, y) is
∂y
∂x
= −Px(q)
Py(q)
= −x− 6000
y − 6000 .
This tangent line slope function (see Figure 8) changes very smoothly and stays in the interval [−1.603567451,−0.6236095645].
Thus the token price fluctuation is quite smooth. Furthermore, this cost function has a convex curve which conforms
to the principle of supply and demand. That is, token price increases when token supply decreases. For constant circle
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cost function market, the sum of prices are bounded by Px(q) + Py(q) = 2(x + y) − 4a. Similar bounds hold for
constant ellipse cost function market. Thus, when it is used for prediction market, there is a limit on the profit that a
market maker can derive from transacting with traders.
Figure 8: The tangent line slope for constant circle automated market maker
Figure 9 compares the cost function curves for different automated market makers that we have discussed. These
curves shows that constant circle/ellipse cost function is among the best ones for DeFi applications.
3.4 Front running attacks
Front running attacks have been well known for automated market makers and can be launched against all automated
market makers with non-constant tangent line slopes. In the following, we use a constant product automated market
maker to illustrate this attack. For a constant product market maker with an initial market state q0 = (1000, 1000),
assume that Alice submits 50 coins of USDT to purchase coins of spade suit token. The front-runner (e.g., a miner)
intercepts this request and uses 200 coins of USDT token to get 166.6666667 coins of spade suit token leaving the
market state at q1 = (1200, 833.3333333). The front-runner submits Alice’s order to the market q1 which returns
33.3333333 coins of spade suit token to Alice with a resulting market state q2 = (1250, 800). Now the front-
runner uses 152.3809524 coins of spade suit token to get 200 USDT coins from q2 with a resulting state q3 =
(1050, 952.3809524). Through this process, the front-runner obtained 166.6666667 − 152.3809524 = 14.2857143
coins of spade suit token for free. This kind of attacks can always be launched if the tangent line scope for the cost
function curve is not a constant. The more the tangent line scope fluctuates around the current market state, the more
profit that the front-runner can make. The analysis in preceding sections shows that tangent line scopes of LS-LMSR
and constant circle/ellipse cost functions fluctuate smoothly and tangent line scopes of constant product/mean cost
functions fluctuate sharply. Thus LS-LMSR and constant circle/ellipse cost function automated markets are more
robust against front running attacks. In practice, when a trader submits a transaction buying coins of token A with
coins of token B (or vice versa), the trader may submit the order at the limit. But the front runner can always try to
profit by letting the trader’s order be executed at the limit price.
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Figure 9: Cost functions (order from bottom up): (x+ y) ln
(
e
x
x+y + e
y
x+y
)
= 2000 · ln (2e1/2), (x+ 6000)2 + (y+
6000)2 = 2× 70002, x+ y = 2000, (x− 6000)2 + (y − 6000)2 = 2× 50002, and xy = 1000000
4 Price amplitude
For constant product/mean automated market makers, the relative price P1(q)P2(q) of the two tokens ranges from 0 (not
inclusive) to ∞. At the time when a tiny portion of one token coin is equivalent to all coins of the other token in
the market maker, no trade is essentially feasible. Thus the claimed advantage that no one can take out all shares of
one token from the constant product/mean market seems to have limited value. For a given LS-LMSR (or constant
circle/ellipse) automated market with an initial state q0, the relative price P1(q)/P2(q) can take values only from a
fixed interval. If the market changes and this relative price interval no long reflects the market price of the two tokens,
one may need to add tokens to the market to adjust this price interval. On the other hand, it may be more efficient to
just cancel this automated market maker and create a new automated market maker when this situation happens.
In the following example, we show how to add liquidity to an existing LS-LMSR automated market maker to
adjust the relative price range. Assume that the market price for a coin of token A is 100 times the price for a
coin of token B when the automated market maker is incorporated. The patron uses 10 coins of token A and 1000
coins of token B to create an automated market maker with the initial state q0 = (1000, 1000). The total market
cost is C(q0) = 2386.294362. Assume that after some time, the automated market maker moves to state q1 =
(100, 1750.618429). At q1, we have P1(q1)/P2(q1) = 0.6809820540 which is close to the lowest possible value
0.6481149479. In order to adjust the automated market maker so that it still works when the value P1/P2 in the
real world goes below 0.6481149479, the patron can add some coins of token A to q1 so that the resulting market
state is q2 = (1750.618429, 1750.618429). To guarantee that one coin of token B is equivalent to
P2(q1)
100·P1(q1) =
0.01468467479 coins of token A in q2, we need to have the following mapping from outstanding shares in q2 to
actual token coins (note that this mapping is different from that for q0):
• Each outstanding share of token A corresponds to 0.01468467479 coin of token A.
• Each outstanding share of token B corresponds to one coin of token B.
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Thus there are 1750.618429× 0.01468467479 = 25.70726231 coins of token A in q2. Since there are only one coin
of tokenA in q1, the patron needs to deposit 24.70726231 coins of tokenA to q1 to move the automated market maker
to state q2. If the market owner chooses not to deposit these tokens to the market, the market maker will still run, but
there is a chance that the outstanding shares of token A goes to zero at certain time.
In the above scenario, one may ask whether it is possible for the market maker to automatically adjust the market
state to q3 = (1750.618429, 1750.618429) by re-assigning the mapping from shares to coins? If q2 automatically
adjusts itself to q3 without external liquidity input, then a trader may use one share of token A to get one share
of token B in q3. Since we only have one equivalent coin of token A but 1750.618429 outstanding shares in q3,
each outstanding share of token A in q3 is equivalent to 0.0005712267068 coins of token A. That is, the trader used
0.0005712267068 coins of tokenA to get one coin of tokenB (note that each outstanding share of tokenB corresponds
to one coin of token B in q3). By our analysis in the preceding paragraphs, at q3, one coin of token B has the same
market value of 0.01468467479 coins of token A. In other words, the trader used 0.0005712267068 coins of token A
to get equivalent 0.01468467479 coins of token A. Thus it is impossible for the automated market to adjust its relative
price range without an external liquidity input.
5 Conclusion
The analysis in the paper shows that constant circle/ellipse cost functions are a better choice for building automated
market makers in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications. One may argue that constant circle/ellipse cost function
based markets have less flexibility after the market is launched since the price amplitude is fixed. We have mentioned
that, though the token price could range from 0 to ∞ in the constant product cost model, when the price for one
token is close to infinity, any meaningful trade in the market is infeasible. Thus the old market needs to be stopped
and a new market should be incorporated. Indeed, it is an advantage for an automated market maker to have a fixed
price amplitude when it is used as a price oracle for other DeFi applications. For the constant product cost market,
if the patron incorporates the automated market maker by deposing a small amount of liquidity, an attacker with a
small budget can manipulate the token price significantly in the automated market maker and take profit from other
DeFi applications that use this automated market maker as a price oracle. For constant circle/ellipse based automated
market makers, the patron can use a small amount of liquidity to set up the automated market and the attacker can only
manipulate the token price within the fixed price amplitude.
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